The Mueller Indictment: The Foreign Agents Registration Act is Unconstitutional

Update: For some reason a video didn't embed properly.  I am updating to fix.  If that doesn't work, I will cut it out for a picture.

So, after another long break, I am back with another post.  In fact, I am planning a series of posts dealing with different issues related to the indictment of thirteen Russian nationals and three Russian companies.  You can read the indictment, here, and you can search through its text, here.  But if you have been following me on twitter, you are seeing me suggest that I see some very serious First Amendment problems in this indictment.

Strap yourself in, dear reader, this is a long one.  We’re going to go very deep into some dense statutes.

So today’s issue is the requirement that you must register as a foreign agent, which the defendants in Mueller's indictment were often allegedly evading.  The requirement comes from 22 U.S.C. § 612, which says in relevant part that “No person shall act as an agent of a foreign principal unless he has filed with the Attorney General a true and complete registration statement...” it goes on to says what you must do to register.  Meanwhile, 18 U.S.C. § 951 sets up criminal penalties if you “act[] in the United States as an agent of a foreign government” without first notifying the Attorney General.

So who is an agent of a foreign principal?  Well, we go over to 22 U.S.C. § 611 which discusses some of the definitions involved and frankly it is a poorly crafted law.  First, we look at the term foreign principal:

(b)       The term “foreign principal” includes—

(1)       a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party;

(2)       a person outside of the United States, unless it is established that such person is an individual and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States, or that such person is not an individual and is organized under or created by the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and has its principal place of business within the United States; and

(3)       a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.

Now right off the bat, I see trouble with a single word: “includes.”  “Includes,” in statutory language means more or less, “the stuff I am about to list, and other stuff.”  Like in ordinary English, if I said “my favorite movies are superhero movies, including Avengers, The Dark Knight and Spider-Man 2,” it would mean that those three movies are among my favorite, as well an unspecified number of other superhero movies.  But you’d have no idea what those other movies were, except for that general description “superhero movies.”

That’s not a big deal if you are talking about what kinds of movies I like.  But it is a big problem when we talk about criminal statutes, especially when you are discussing ones that regulate expression.  There is a concept in First Amendment law called the “void for vagueness” doctrine.  As the Supreme Court has said

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute “abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” it “operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.” Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to “ `steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”

In other words, first, you have a right to a clear idea what is illegal, so you can avoid doing it.  Second, by being specific in the law, you avoid the danger of any kind of inappropriate discrimination—be it according to race, sex, religion, viewpoint or anything else.  And finally, if you are not sure what a law means, it might frighten you into being silent when you have a right to speak, if only to avoid trouble.

By using the word “include” they are saying there are an unknown subset of people who may or may not be foreign principals under this law with absolutely no guidance in the law to tell you who they might be.  That is the very definition of vagueness—they give you literally no idea who else might be included.

And just so you understand the rest, let’s look at this part again:

a person outside of the United States, unless it is established that such person is an individual...

Stopping there, do you know how sometimes in law a “person” can be a corporation or various other business and political entities?  Under the law, for instance, the New York Times is a person, as a convenient legal fiction.  Well, in the same language of the law, if you want to talk about a human being, a real person, in the law, the most common code word is “individual.”  So you see in the passage they differentiate between people who are individuals (that is, human beings) and ones that are not (i.e. a fictitious person, such as a business entity). 

...and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States...

Domiciled is also a legal term of art.  It is not simply where you live, but where you intend to live in the long term.  You can spend a month in Milan, Italy, but so long as you intend to return to the United States, then you are domiciled in the United States.  So under this language, if a real flesh-and-blood human being is a citizen of the United States, currently abroad but intending to return, then they are not a foreign principal under this passage.

...or that such person is not an individual...

This is not a Monty Python and the Life of Brian situation:

No, this statute presumes you humans are all actually individuals.  Instead, by discussing persons who are not individuals, they are talking about non-human legal persons, such as corporations.  And with all of that, the rest of this will hopefully be able to be pieced together.

...and is organized under or created by the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and has its principal place of business within the United States; and

But after that explainer on the meaning of “foreign principal,” let’s now turn to the definition of “agent of a foreign principal.”  Here you go:

(c)        Expect as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the term “agent of a foreign principal” means—

(1)       any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person—

(i)        engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal;

(ii)       acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal;

(iii)      within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal; or

(iv)      within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the United States; and

(2)       any person who agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal as defined in clause (1) of this subsection.

(d)       The term “agent of a foreign principal” does not include any news or press service or association organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication for which there is on file with the United States Postal Service information in compliance with section 3611 of title 39, published in the United States, solely by virtue of any bona fide news or journalistic activities, including the solicitation or acceptance of advertisements, subscriptions, or other compensation therefor, so long as it is at least 80 per centum beneficially owned by, and its officers and directors, if any, are citizens of the United States, and such news or press service or association, newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication, is not owned, directed, supervised, controlled, subsidized, or financed, and none of its policies are determined by any foreign principal defined in subsection (b) of this section, or by any agent of a foreign principal required to register under this subchapter;

So one thing that leaps out at you is that there are typos in the law.  If you go to the Cornell Law School website I linked to, there are footnotes twice in this area: once when they say that “expect” probably should be “except,” and a second time when they reference apparently the wrong statute.  According to the notes following this law, the last amendment was in 1995.  The fact that they have left these glaring and obvious errors in a statute with criminal consequences for over 20 years is inexcusable.

But even ignoring this, problems abound in this definition law.  How bad is this?  A wife buying a DVD for her husband at his request would technically be an “agent of a foreign principal” and it would be a crime for her to buy that DVD without first registering with the Attorney General.

Or, perhaps you are on twitter and you see this tweet:

Got 2 mins? Watch & share our video on the Human Rights Act! #HRA #ECHR #HumanRightshttps://t.co/nyQxAPEa35

— BIHR (@BIHRhumanrights) February 16, 2018

Well, if you do indeed watch or share this video, without first registering as an agent of a foreign principal, you’re committing a crime.

Let’s break that down, shall we?  First, many ordinary people in your life can instantly become agents of foreign principals at the drop of a hat.  As you recall, one of the ways you can become a foreign principal is if you are “a person outside of the United States, unless it is established that such person is an individual and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States.”

So let’s say your significant other is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, maybe a British citizen.  Then that person goes to Milan, Italy.  Well, that person fits the definition of “foreign principal.”  S/he is a “person outside of the United States” (in Italy), and even if she is domiciled here (because she plans to return and live here long-term) she is not a citizen, remember?

As for that tweet, it was sent by the British Institute of Human Rights, which, as suggested by the title, is British.  That would mean it is a legal entity, which would make it a “a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country” which is part of the definition of foreign principal.

So there are two ways for that person you are interacting with—your spouse or this random twitterer—to become a foreign principal.  But how does that make you an agent of that principal?  Well, look at the language.  Now obviously, you wouldn’t necessarily be that foreign principal’s “agent, representative, employee or servant.”  First, that use of the word, “agent” is probably best understood as using the common law definition of “agent,” which you can read here, if you really feel like it.  The key thing is if you cannot sign a contract on behalf of the other person and bind them to it, you aren’t an agent in the eyes of the law.  The term servant or representative, meanwhile, isn’t too hard to understand.

But you don’t have to be any of those things, because you can be covered if you are a “person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal[.]”  First, it is common to refer to a person as acting in their capacity as a husband or wife in the law.  But really, it is far from clear what other kinds of capacities won’t be found to exist, so “any other capacity” might include “capacity as a reader” or “capacity as an activist.”  The real limitation in that quoted passage (“person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal”) is the requirement that he or she are acting at the prompting of a foreign principal.  And in that case, all it takes is a request.  So if your husband requests that you buy a DVD, at a point in time when he is a foreign principal as I explained above, and you do it, then you are acting at the request of a foreign principal, fitting every part of that definition.  Likewise, if you do indeed view and share that video in the tweet of the British Institute of Human Rights then you are acting at the request of that foreign principal.  Yet, in both cases, your conduct is something you have an absolute right to engage in under the First Amendment.  You may buy DVDs (so long as they are not something constitutionally prohibited, like child porn), and you can certainly retweet another person’s tweet.

So that seems kind of broad, doesn’t it?  Like maybe even overly broad?  Well, there is another legal doctrine implicated by that: the overbreadth doctrine.  The idea is that even if a statute is not vague, it still might reach too far.  Consider, for example, the events that might trigger the reporting requirement:

1) Piers Morgan, a British citizen, tells citizens around the world that they should rally for gun control on TV from London, and you (an American in America) do so as a result.

2) Malala Yousafzai, a Nobel Prize recipient for promoting women’s education in Afghanistan, and a Pakistani, Canadian and perhaps British citizen, makes a documentary in which she asks for American politicians to financially support women’s education around the world, and then she makes a deal with Warner Brothers to distribute that documentary in the U.S.

3) A man marries a Canadian woman who had a daughter by a previous marriage.  Both the mother and daughter are Canadian citizens and American green card holders.  While the mother and daughter are visiting family in Canada, the step-father asks his step-daughter what she would like for her birthday.  The step-daughter says she wants a specific book, and he buys it.

In each case, these are activities that are protected by the First Amendment that are burdened by this registration requirement.  And bear in mind, if you actually read what has to go into the registration, it’s quite a bit of information, but one of the most important requirements is that you list each principal you are an agent of.  So that means every time you get a new one, you have to re-register—you can’t just tell them in general you are going to be listening to foreigners who speak on different subjects and occasionally be influenced by them.  So, if today you see Malala on Twitter ask her supporters to tweet in favor of gun control, then according to this statute, you cannot do so at her request, unless you first register with the Attorney General, at pain of criminal punishment.  But suppose you send off your registration, tweet about gun control, following Malala’s request, and then tomorrow, you see Malala’s mother ask you to tweet in favor of women’s equality.  Well, guess what?  Tou can’t do that, until you register again.  Hopefully, you can at least get away with some cutting and pasting when you do it.

But the problems with the statute doesn’t stop there.  For instance, imagine if Super-Duper-Power Company (“SDPC”) runs an ad telling you how wonderfully environmentally conscious they are and urges everyone to participate in Earth Hour—that virtue-signaling nonsense when you turn off many non-essential electrical items for one hour toward the end of March.  So you are a good environmentalist type and decide you are going to do exactly that.  Then you remember that you might become an agent of a foreign principal if you act at the request of a “a person [which can be a corporation] any of whose activities are directly ... controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal[.]”  So then that means that you need to look into whether any of the stockholders are foreign principals, or perhaps important officers in the company are foreign principals.  I mean even an American company operating in America, owned by Americans, might still have a President or CEO who is a foreigner who telecommuting from outside of America.  Indeed, if SDPC got a big enough loan from a foreign bank, that might be enough to make them into a foreign principal that you are acting at the request of.  And then of course one’s status as a foreign principal might change from day to day.  For instance, 51% of the stock of this fictional SDPC might be owned by a lawful green card holder originally from Australia, who then decides to go home for Christmas to the old country.  So before that vacation, obeying the requests of SDPC does not make you an agent of a foreign principal, but during the vacation it does, and then when the vacation is over, it doesn’t, again.  And how the hell you are supposed to keep track of that sort of thing is anybody’s guess.

But, dear reader, it gets worse!  Did you notice that phrase “in major part?”  So, suppose we imagine that SDPC is an American company, in America, where one American who never leaves America controls 51% of the stock and has appointed himself President and other American citizens sans passports in every other position down all the way to janitor.  But what if 11% of the stock is owned by a Saudi businessman?  Is that enough of a part to be a “major part” of ownership or finance?  Or perhaps out of $100 million in loans SDPC has received, $11 million came from this Saudi.  Is that enough to make it so that everyone who acts at the request of this company an agent of a foreign principal?  Just how much of a part does a foreigner have to play in order for it to count as a major part?  There’s no good way to know.

And it gets even worse.  Suppose you know for a fact that SDPC is 100% American, no foreign employees, no foreign stockholders, no foreign money at all.  It’s as American as Steve Rogers baking an apple pie in the shape of the American flag, using fireworks as a heat source.  So, they put out that Earth Hour ad, and you decide to participate.  Well, guess what?  You might still be an agent of a foreign principal.  Why?  Because SDPC might have acted at the direction of a foreigner.  What does direction mean?  Well, I don’t see a statutory definition, but in that situation the courts are likely to look at something like Black’s Law Dictionary (I am looking at the Sixth Edition, for you law nerds), which defines “direct,” when used as a verb, as meaning “[t]o point to; guide; order; command; instruct.  To advise; suggest; request.”  And little did you know, but that super-American company hired a foreign consulting company to suggest ways to improve their operations and they gave their advice telephonically from their home country.  So in the language of the statute, you “act[ed] in any other capacity at the ... request ... of a person any of whose activities are ... directed ... in whole or in major part by a foreign principal[.]”  Is that consultancy enough to constitute a “major part?”  There is literally no way of knowing.

But you might remember there are still limitations I have quoted.  That is, even if you act at the request of a forbidden human or entity, you are still only an agent of a foreign power if you also (directly or through any other person) does one of the following:

(i)        engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal;

(ii)       acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal;

(iii)      within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal; or

(iv)      within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the United States; and

But so far all of my examples are covered.  For instance, joining an anti-gun rally at the request of a foreign principal would seem to be self-evidently politically activity, meeting subsection (i).  Actually, examining the statute’s definition of “political activity” verifies it is pretty close to what you might guess:

any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party;

So the Piers Morgan anti-gun rally would be covered.  The same can be said for Malala distributing a documentary.  The step-father buying a book for his Canadian step-daughter or the person buying a DVD for their spouse would be “within the United States ... collect[ing] ... other things of value for ... such foreign principal,” falling under subsection (iii).  And even retweeting a British human rights organization’s tweet can trigger subsection (i) related to political activities, because that would be “activity ... with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party” meeting the definition of political activity.

But, there is another landmine buried in all of this.  You might notice that these subsections repeatedly talk about activities “for or in the interests of such foreign principal.”  This limits the application of the law, but it also makes it vague.  I mean, certainly if your activities are putting money in that foreign principal’s pocket, then it is clearly in their interest.  But what about my fictional SDPC promoting Earth Hour?  Using less electricity is clearly not in the direct financial interest of a fictional power company, but at the same time the goodwill generated by pretending to care about the environment might be.  One could argue that just about every action is in a foreign principal’s interest.  World peace might be good for a person’s business, or war might be good for their business. 

But there is yet another problem with that interest requirement.  It then means that this is a regulation based on viewpoint and viewpoint discrimination is uniquely prohibited in First Amendment analysis.

Consider for instance, what the Supreme Court said in RAV v. St. Paul.  In that case, a local ordinance said

Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

The Supreme Court struck down this hate speech law, writing in part:

In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination...  One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but not that all “papists” are, for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

You see, under the First Amendment, discrimination against expression based on content is not quite forbidden, but it’s almost impossible to justify.  By “content” the courts mean the subject of the expression, but not the viewpoint.  So a law banning all political speech in a certain place is engaged in content-based discrimination; but one that prohibits conservative political speech in that place is a viewpoint-based discrimination.  To justify content-based discrimination, the government has to show the regulation at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling purpose.  Meanwhile, while case law indicates that viewpoint discrimination is just plain forbidden.

So picture this scenario.  Imagine that a British citizen named John Doe was locked up in Britain because he was convicted of violating that country’s hate speech laws.  From prison, Doe is allowed to hold a press conference where he says “I want everyone to tell my country to abolish these hate speech laws and stand up for free speech, and if you are in a foreign country, I want you to ask your government to pressure my country to abolish these hate speech laws.”  So you, an American, write a letter the President of the United States telling him to demand that Britain abolish its hate speech laws under threat of embargo.  Well, you know by now this makes you an agent of a foreign principal (the principal being Doe), and that is obviously engaging in “political activities... in the interest of such foreign principal.”  So that would require registration beforehand, on pain of criminal punishment.

But now imagine that a second British citizen, Jane Roe, is convicted of violating that country’s hate speech laws and she is allowed to give a press conference.  But in this case, she says the following: “I am wrongly accused.  I didn’t actually say the things they said I did.  But I still believe that hate speech laws are a good idea.  I know John Doe told people outside of Britain to urge your governments to put pressure on Britain to abolish those laws.  I advise you to do the opposite.  Write to your government in support of these laws.”  Now, suppose you decide that she is right, hate speech laws are a great idea, and so you write to the American President telling him that he should support Britain’s hate speech laws.

Well, guess what?  In that second scenario, you would very obviously fall outside of the law.  I mean Roe’s message in relation to hate speech laws is obviously not in her own interest.  Clearly, any person in prison for violating a law has an interest in seeing those laws abolished given that would free them.  So, it is manifestly clear that an American advocating that Britain keep those laws is not in her interest.

But then that means that whether the registration requirement is triggered depends on the point of view being promoted.  If you are pro-hate speech laws, you are fine; but if you are opposed, then failure to register is a crime.  That is viewpoint discrimination.

And it gets even worse.  See, there is even an exception to the interest requirement, and it is... special.  Let me quote it to you, which comes in a different statute from the same chapter:

(f) Defense of foreign government vital to United States defense

Any person, or employee of such person, whose foreign principal is a government of a foreign country the defense of which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States while, (1) such person or employee engages only in activities which are in furtherance of the policies, public interest, or national defense both of such government and of the Government of the United States, and are not intended to conflict with any of the domestic or foreign policies of the Government of the United States, (2) each communication or expression by such person or employee which he intends to, or has reason to believe will, be published, disseminated, or circulated among any section of the public, or portion thereof, within the United States, is a part of such activities and is believed by such person to be truthful and accurate and the identity of such person as an agent of such foreign principal is disclosed therein, and (3) such government of a foreign country furnishes to the Secretary of State for transmittal to, and retention for the duration of this subchapter by, the Attorney General such information as to the identity and activities of such person or employee at such times as the Attorney General may require. Upon notice to the Government of which such person is an agent or to such person or employee, the Attorney General, having due regard for the public interest and national defense, may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, and shall, at the request of the Secretary of State, terminate in whole or in part the exemption herein of any such person or employee;

That’s a lot to dig through, but here’s the first thing to highlight: it sets up different rules depending on which countries you are defending, and which countries get this special treatment can change any time the President decides.  So if the President designates Israel as a country whose defense is deemed vital to the defense to the United States, but he doesn’t do this for Iran, a message at the request of the Israeli government on behalf of Israel that Iran should be bombed into the stone age is entitled to the special protection of this law, while a message at the request of the government Iran that Israel should be similarly bombed is not.  Now, the fact I am more inclined to believe Iran should be bombed doesn’t stop me from recognizing that my view on this point is exactly that: a viewpoint.

But even within that exception there is even more viewpoint-based discrimination.  For instance, your advocacy has to be “in furtherance of the policies, public interest, or national defense both of such government and of the Government of the United States, and are not intended to conflict with any of the domestic or foreign policies of the Government of the United States.”  So if you advocate peace between Israel and Iran, at the request of the Isreali government, and some jury decides that is not in the interest of the United States, then you are not entitled to this statutory exception.  That is viewpoint discrimination within viewpoint discrimination.

I could go on and on, but suffice to say there are other problems in the law.  But we have gone over enough.  We have identified at least two vague terms, we have shown massive overbreadth, and we have shown content- and viewpoint-based discrimination.  If challenged before the Supreme Court, I think most justices’ responses would be something along the line of “are you kidding us?”  This will not survive any serious constitutional inquiry—at least not given the ideological makeup of the current court.

So, finally, a reasonable question might be “why has this law stayed on the books for so long?”  I think the reality is that even when a law is unconstitutional most people will “go along to get along.”  Most people who are knowingly going to engage in real advocacy for a foreign power register, and I have seen no sign that the government has gone after the people tweeting at some foreign activist’s request.  So you are not getting outrageous prosecutions.  And it is worth noting that the problems with this statute has only become more pronounced with the rise of social media.  Direct communications between people across borders is easier than ever, so it is easier than ever for an American to unwittingly violate this law by acting at the request of another.

But the undeniable fact is that flagrantly unconstitutional laws can remain on the books for decades before being struck down.  For instance, in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the trademark statute that barred trademarks that disparaged groups.  Basically, this case is why the Redskins get to keep their trademark even though it is allegedly racist—because it is not the Federal Government’s business that a trademark might be racist.  (In Tam, the censorship is much dumber than that.)  And it wasn’t even close: it was a unanimous decision.

And yet this blatantly unconstitutional law remained on the books for around 70 years and as best I can tell, there was no serious constitutional challenge to it until the Tam case.  I think the foreign registration laws are similar “dead laws walking.”  They are still on the books, but it will take only one person challenging it to strike it down.

And any citizen can challenge it.  So maybe one of our civil rights organizations will wake up and make the argument I made.  Only time will tell.  But I do not believe it can survive this challenge.

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My wife and I lost our jobs due to the harassment of convicted terrorist (and adjudicated statutory rapist) Brett Kimberlin, including an attempt to get us killed and to frame me for a crime carrying a sentence of up to ten years.  I know that claim sounds fantastic, but if you read starting here, you will see absolute proof of these claims using documentary and video evidence.  If you would like to help in the fight to hold Mr. Kimberlin accountable, please hit the donation link on the right.  And thank you.

Follow me at Twitter @aaronworthing, mostly for snark and site updates.

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Disclaimer:

I have accused some people, particularly Brett Kimberlin, of reprehensible conduct.  In some cases, the conduct is even criminal.  In all cases, the only justice I want is through the appropriate legal process—such as the criminal justice system.  I do not want to see vigilante violence against any person or any threat of such violence.  This kind of conduct is not only morally wrong, but it is counter-productive.

In the particular case of Brett Kimberlin, I do not want you to even contact him.  Do not call him.  Do not write him a letter.  Do not write him an email.  Do not text-message him.  Do not engage in any kind of directed communication.  I say this in part because under Maryland law, that can quickly become harassment and I don’t want that to happen to him.

And for that matter, don’t go on his property.  Don’t sneak around and try to photograph him.  Frankly try not to even be within his field of vision.  Your behavior could quickly cross the line into harassment in that way too (not to mention trespass and other concerns).

And do not contact his organizations, either.  And most of all, leave his family alone.

The only exception to all that is that if you are reporting on this, there is of course nothing wrong with contacting him for things like his official response to any stories you might report.  And even then if he tells you to stop contacting him, obey that request.  That this is a key element in making out a harassment claim under Maryland law—that a person asks you to stop and you refuse.

And let me say something else.  In my heart of hearts, I don’t believe that any person supporting me has done any of the above.  But if any of you have, stop it, and if you haven’t don’t start.