So we arrive at the hidden booby trap in all of this, severability. That is the subject of the first of two oral arguments today, which you can listen to, here.
As you all know, Obamacare is a massive bill. Indeed you will see a couple comments related to its massiveness as we go through the argument. So what happens to the rest of the law if only one part of it is found to be unconstitutional?
I mean imagine for instance if we have a law that says 1) flag burning is hereby banned, and 2) we will appropriate $40,000 for more FBI agents. That’s all in the same law. Now after
Texas v. Johnson, the first part is clearly unconstitutional but equally obvious that the second part is not. So does that mean that you have to throw out appropriations part of that law?
One thing to get about this, also, is that this is not a matter of law but of equity. I will say in all frankness that I had no idea what equity meant in the judicial context before I started my legal training, so I assume that most non-lawyers have no idea, either. So let me give you a quick primer (and if you are a lawyer feel free to skip ahead):
It has to do with the dual nature of our judiciary. You see in England they started with the courts of law, which followed the common law (judge-made law) and whatever statutes were applicable. The rules were fairly rigid, and the only thing you got were damages—that is, money. I mean that is a gross over-simplification of things, but it serves as a reasonable thumbnail sketch.
Well, over time it was felt that it was not enough to simply give a person money when their rights were violated. So somewhere along the way people started going to the Church of England and asking for more. So the Chancellor who heard those cases would listen to both sides and tell one person or another to do X or else they would go to Hell. Yes, literally.
Now all the judicial history is a little fuzzy to me but what I do know is that by the time America broke off from England these ecclesiastical courts became more like regular courts, at least in America. For instance, up until really recently in Virginia, the systems were still semi-separate. You would have the same judges in the same courtrooms, but on some days they would be chancellors sitting in courts of equity and on other days they would be judges sitting in courts of law. And this would result in confusion where a court of equity would tell you to go to a court of law and the court of law would tell you to go to a court of equity. Over time most states merged the systems together—including Virginia—so that same cases would rightfully contain both law and equity. And of course long ago they stopped sentencing you to Hell for disobeying their injunctions, but instead would send you to jail.
I think severability has to be understood as an equitable doctrine. I say this based on my understanding of the doctrine of judicial review—that is the idea of striking down statutes that do not jibe with the constitution. First that popular phrase “striking down statutes” is actually a misnomer. It makes it sound like the United States Supreme Court is going into the statute books and ripping the statute out. When I read
Marbury v. Madison, for instance, what I see is almost like judicial
civil disobedience, the way Martin Luther King understood the term. They aren’t saying that the law isn’t on the books, but they are saying that they will not help the other branches enforce an unconstitutional rule. Indeed there is a strong parallel between Martin Luther King’s logic in declaring that “an unjust law is no law at all” and Chief Justice John Marshall reasoning that an unconstitutional law is no law at all.
But that approach is self-limiting. In my hypothetical flag burning/funding for the FBI statute, judicial review gives the courts the power to say “we aren’t going along with that flag burning part” and refuse to enforce that law, but that doesn’t justify, by itself, refusing to honor that appropriation to the FBI. So I think you have to understand the idea of severability—or more precisely the idea that certain parts of a law cannot be severed from another—as a matter of equity.
And that is important, because equity is weird and its reasoning does not sound very much like traditional legal analysis. Of course in a real way it has been part of the judiciary from the beginning and lawyers are expected to be as versed in equity as they are in law, but it still feels outside of the law. For instance in most cases courts sitting in equity will consider “the public interest” before granting equity. That is not an appropriate concern in a legal matter (although that is often considered). You have to weigh the harms of one party against the harms of another in equity. You have to consider many mushy factors that just don’t apply to legal claims.
So for instance in
Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court declared that racial segregation in schools was illegal. Did that mean that the very next day every school had to desegregate or even potentially integrate? No. Because when it came to issuing injunctions declaring that a school shall stop discriminating along the lines of race, that became a matter of equity. So in fact in legal circles, there are
two Brown decisions. In
Brown (I), the court famously stated that this situation was illegal and in
Brown II, the Supreme Court gave some guidance to the lower courts on how to begin to end school segregation.
So when the Supreme Court talks about severability the courts are given permission to consider things that ordinarily are things I don’t rightfully think they should consider, such as what is the best policy (the public interest) and the like.
By the way, once you understand the distinction between law and equity you will never read the Constitution the same way again. For instance, this understanding brings new meaning to the familiar line in Article III, Section 2 that “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution...” Or consider the Seventh Amendment, which states that “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved[.]” Now, knowing about the courts of equity (if you didn’t before) you notice that by specifying the common law, as opposed to equity, they are implicitly saying that you do not have a right to a jury in a case at equity and that is precisely how the courts have read this provision.
Returning to the subject, I know that is a long introduction, but bluntly I am hoping it colors how you see this discussion going forward.
Now overall, I think on balance there is a weaker conservative majority favoring the idea that the entire law has to fall in this case. And this seems to be a case where the courts would be “making new law” that is making a new rule. This is not necessarily illegitimate even in a case at law, because the courts have always been allowed to make new law where the statute does not fill things in. This is what we call the common law—judge made law. And one of the best ways to convince a court to make new common law is to show them that their previous judge-made law did not adequately address the current circumstance.
As I discussed in my Patterico days the rule on severability was laid out in
Buckley v. Valeo.
Buckley will come up several times during this discussion but in that case they struck down part of a campaign finance law and left the rest in place. In that case, the Court said:
Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.
So it’s a two part test: does the rest of the law even work without the invalid portion? And if it does, is it still the case it is evident that but for this provision, Congress would not have passed this law?
Well, what many of the conservatives seem to be saying is, “that’s all well and good if you are talking about a provision in a law that is in the periphery. So if we are talking about a 2,000 page budget appropriation where one Congressman put in a rider banning flag burning, it makes sense to invalidate that rider without throwing out the entire budge of the United States. But this provision goes to the heart of the law, and it’s a different thing entirely to cut that out and expect the statute to limp on.” I don’t believe that was something they said before, so it would be a case of making new law, but it is a reasonable evolution of the federal common law.
So let’s jump into the interesting passages. Again the only ordering here is chronological, with one exception.